# Free SC-100 practice questions

> 10 free SC-100 practice questions with the correct answer and an explanation.

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### Question 1 of 10

A manufacturer was hit by ransomware that encrypted its Azure VMs and then deleted the Recovery Services vault recovery points using a compromised Owner account. The CISO wants backups that an attacker with Owner rights on the subscription still cannot destroy. Which design BEST meets this requirement?

- A. Assign the Backup Contributor role only through PIM with approval, and create an Azure Policy that audits any Recovery Services vault with soft delete disabled
- B. Replicate the VMs to a secondary region with Azure Site Recovery and restrict the recovery plan so only members of a dedicated Microsoft Entra group can trigger a failover
- C. Lock vault immutability, keep soft delete always-on, and require multi-user authorization through a Resource Guard owned by a separate tenant
- D. Export daily VM snapshots to a storage account that uses customer-managed keys in Azure Key Vault with purge protection enabled and a private endpoint

**Answer:** C

**Explanation:** A locked immutable vault prevents recovery points from being deleted before expiry, always-on soft delete keeps deleted data recoverable, and multi-user authorization via a Resource Guard owned by another tenant means a single compromised Owner cannot disable those protections. Site Recovery replication would faithfully replicate the encrypted state and offers no protection against deletion. Snapshots in a storage account can still be deleted by an Owner, and CMK only protects confidentiality. PIM and an audit policy reduce standing access but do not stop someone already holding Owner from deleting data.

### Question 2 of 10

After a security review, a bank discovers that an internal developer with legitimate access exported large volumes of customer records before resigning. The architect must design controls aligned with Microsoft guidance for insider risk without monitoring all employees equally. Which design BEST fits?

- A. Purview Insider Risk Management with a departing-user data theft policy using HR connector signals, plus adaptive protection for DLP
- B. Microsoft Purview Communication Compliance policies that scan all Teams and email messages for keywords related to resignation and job searching
- C. Microsoft Defender for Identity honeytoken accounts in Active Directory combined with alerts for reconnaissance against domain controllers
- D. Microsoft Sentinel UEBA enabled on all identities with an analytics rule that blocks any user whose anomaly score exceeds a fixed threshold

**Answer:** A

**Explanation:** Insider Risk Management correlates indicators such as resignation dates from an HR connector with exfiltration activity, and adaptive protection dynamically applies stricter DLP only to users with elevated risk, avoiding uniform monitoring. Communication compliance inspects messages for policy violations but does not detect data exfiltration patterns. Honeytokens detect attackers performing AD reconnaissance, not legitimate users exporting data. UEBA highlights anomalies but analytics rules do not block users, and a fixed threshold for everyone is not a risk-adaptive design.

### Question 3 of 10

Administrators can currently modify Conditional Access policies from any device after signing in with MFA. The security team wants changes to Conditional Access policies to require a phishing-resistant method and a compliant device at the moment of the change, without forcing these on every admin sign-in. What should the architect design?

- A. A PIM role setting for Conditional Access Administrator that requires approval and justification for activation, with a maximum activation of one hour
- B. A Conditional Access policy targeting the Conditional Access Administrator role that requires phishing-resistant authentication strength at every sign-in
- C. A sign-in frequency of every time for the Azure portal and the Microsoft Entra admin center, combined with a token protection session control
- D. Protected actions that link the Conditional Access permissions to an authentication context requiring phishing-resistant MFA and a compliant device

**Answer:** D

**Explanation:** Protected actions associate sensitive permissions, such as updating Conditional Access policies, with an authentication context, and a Conditional Access policy targeting that context enforces step-up only when the action is attempted. A role-targeted policy applies at every sign-in, which the requirement explicitly avoids. PIM approval controls activation but does not enforce device compliance at the moment of the change. Sign-in frequency affects whole sessions, not specific actions, and token protection does not check device compliance for individual operations.

### Question 4 of 10 (choose 2)

A company synchronizes on-premises AD DS to Microsoft Entra ID. Following a breach elsewhere, the architect must ensure an on-premises compromise cannot easily lead to a cloud tenant takeover. Which TWO recommendations should be included? (Choose two.)

- A. Treat the Microsoft Entra Connect Sync server as a control-plane (Tier 0) asset and restrict who can administer it
- B. Enable password writeback for administrator accounts so on-premises and cloud admin passwords always match
- C. Use cloud-only accounts for Microsoft Entra privileged roles instead of synchronized accounts
- D. Synchronize all on-premises Domain Admins into Microsoft Entra ID so they can be protected by Conditional Access
- E. Federate authentication with AD FS so that on-premises domain controllers validate every cloud sign-in

**Answer:** A, C

**Explanation:** Cloud-only privileged accounts break the path from on-premises compromise to cloud admin rights, and the Entra Connect server holds credentials that can modify the tenant's synced objects, so it must be protected as a control-plane asset. Syncing Domain Admins to the cloud links the two trust boundaries. Password writeback for admins couples cloud admin credentials to the on-premises directory. Federating through AD FS makes cloud authentication depend on on-premises infrastructure, increasing the attack surface.

### Question 5 of 10

A healthcare provider must demonstrate that every Azure subscription continuously meets HIPAA/HITRUST controls and wants auditors to see control-level status, while engineers need to know which resources to fix. Which design BEST meets both needs?

- A. Assign Azure Policy Deny effects for every HIPAA control so noncompliant resources can never be created, and give auditors read access to activity logs
- B. Add the HIPAA/HITRUST standard in Defender for Cloud regulatory compliance and use its control view with linked recommendations
- C. Run a Microsoft Purview Compliance Manager assessment for HIPAA and have engineers upload screenshots as evidence for each improvement action
- D. Enable the Defender for Cloud default MCSB standard only and export Secure Score to Power BI so auditors can compare it to the HIPAA control list

**Answer:** B

**Explanation:** Defender for Cloud's regulatory compliance dashboard maps a standard such as HIPAA/HITRUST to controls and links each control to assessments and recommendations, giving auditors status and engineers actionable resources. Secure Score is not mapped to HIPAA controls. Compliance Manager tracks the broader program but manual screenshots are not continuous technical assessment of Azure resources. Many controls cannot be expressed as Deny policies, and activity logs do not show control-level compliance.

### Question 6 of 10

A manufacturer builds Linux-based smart controllers that connect to Azure IoT Hub and will run at customer sites for ten years. The architect must specify device security requirements that protect device identity and firmware integrity over the product's life. What should be specified?

- A. Defender for Endpoint for Linux installed on each controller and onboarded to Defender for Servers for vulnerability assessment and EDR
- B. A shared symmetric enrollment key embedded in all firmware images, with updates downloaded over HTTP from a public CDN to simplify delivery
- C. Per-device X.509 certificates stored in a readable file on the device's flash storage, with firmware updates applied manually by technicians during annual site visits
- D. Hardware-protected per-device identity (TPM or secure element) provisioned through DPS, secure boot, and signed updates via Device Update for IoT Hub

**Answer:** D

**Explanation:** Keeping each device's identity in a TPM or secure element, provisioning it through the Device Provisioning Service, enforcing secure boot and delivering signed over-the-air updates with Device Update for IoT Hub protects identity and firmware integrity for the product's lifetime. A shared enrollment key and unsigned HTTP updates let one compromise affect every device. Certificates in readable storage can be extracted, and annual manual updates leave devices unpatched. Defender for Endpoint targets general-purpose servers and is not a design for embedded controller identity and firmware integrity.

### Question 7 of 10

An AKS platform team is defining security requirements for container orchestration. Pods must authenticate to Azure SQL and Key Vault without secrets, cluster API access must be governed by Microsoft Entra ID, and east-west traffic must be restricted. Which set of requirements BEST meets this?

- A. Service principals per pod stored in Key Vault, Entra integration with Kubernetes RBAC only, and a private endpoint for the API server
- B. Microsoft Entra Workload ID for pods, Entra integration with Azure RBAC for Kubernetes authorization, and Kubernetes network policies
- C. Kubernetes secrets encrypted with KMS for pod credentials, local cluster accounts for operators, and NSG rules on the node subnet
- D. Pod-managed identity add-on for pods, client certificates for cluster administrators, and Azure Firewall rules between namespaces

**Answer:** B

**Explanation:** Microsoft Entra Workload ID federates Kubernetes service accounts with Entra identities so pods need no secrets, Entra integration with Azure RBAC governs API access, and network policies restrict pod-to-pod traffic. KMS-encrypted secrets are still secrets and local accounts bypass Entra governance, while NSGs cannot filter pod-level traffic. The pod-managed identity add-on is deprecated, and Azure Firewall does not inspect traffic between pods on the same cluster. Service principal secrets still require secret management, and a private API endpoint does not restrict east-west traffic.

### Question 8 of 10

A company wants to use Microsoft Entra Internet Access as a secure web gateway. Requirements: block gambling and malware categories for all users, allow a specific gambling-industry research site for the analytics team, and enforce policies only on managed devices. Which configuration BEST meets the requirements?

- A. A single web content filtering policy blocking both categories, with the research site added to the Microsoft Entra named locations as a trusted IP range
- B. Web content filtering policies in prioritized security profiles, with an allow profile for the analytics team, enforced via Conditional Access
- C. Defender for Cloud Apps unsanctioned app tagging for gambling sites, combined with Defender for Endpoint network protection for the analytics team
- D. Azure Firewall Premium web categories on the hub virtual network, with remote users connecting through point-to-site VPN for inspection

**Answer:** B

**Explanation:** In Entra Internet Access, filtering policies are grouped into security profiles with priorities and linked to Conditional Access, so a higher-priority allow profile for one group can override the baseline block and the policy can require compliant devices. Named locations describe sign-in source networks and do not allow destinations. Cloud Apps tagging targets SaaS apps and is not a categorized web filtering design for this case. Routing remote users through VPN to Azure Firewall is the legacy pattern SSE replaces.

### Question 9 of 10

A company stores regulated data in Azure Storage. Requirements: no shared key or account SAS usage, encryption keys controlled by the company with the ability to revoke, an additional encryption layer at the infrastructure level, and no public network access. Which design meets ALL requirements?

- A. Use account SAS with a stored access policy, customer-managed keys in Managed HSM, and a storage firewall allowing the corporate IP range
- B. Disallow Shared Key authorization, use customer-provided keys per request, enable immutable storage, and allow trusted Microsoft services only
- C. Disallow Shared Key, use customer-managed keys in Key Vault, enable infrastructure encryption at creation, and use private endpoints
- D. Use user delegation SAS tokens, Microsoft-managed keys with double encryption, and a service endpoint restricted to the application subnet

**Answer:** C

**Explanation:** Disallowing Shared Key forces Entra authorization, customer-managed keys allow revocation, infrastructure encryption adds a second layer but must be enabled when the account is created, and private endpoints remove public access. Microsoft-managed keys do not give the company revocation control, and service endpoints keep the public endpoint. Customer-provided keys are supplied per request and do not match revocable account-level control, and immutability is unrelated. Account SAS depends on Shared Key, which violates the first requirement.

### Question 10 of 10

A company runs Azure SQL Database with sensitive data. Security wants threat alerts for SQL injection, regular vulnerability assessments with baselines, and audit logs centralized in the SOC's Sentinel workspace. Which design meets all requirements?

- A. Enable Transparent data encryption with a customer-managed key and schedule manual quarterly reviews of database permissions
- B. Enable Defender for Storage on the server's audit storage account and Advanced Threat Protection on the App Service front end
- C. Configure dynamic data masking and row-level security, and stream query store data to an event hub for the SOC
- D. Enable Defender for Azure SQL with vulnerability assessment, and configure SQL auditing to the Sentinel workspace

**Answer:** D

**Explanation:** Defender for Azure SQL provides threat detection for injection and anomalous access plus vulnerability assessment with baselines, and SQL auditing can send logs directly to the Log Analytics workspace used by Sentinel. Defender for Storage protects storage, not SQL threats. Masking and row-level security are data access controls, and query store is performance data. TDE and manual reviews provide neither threat detection nor centralized auditing.

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