200-201
Free 200-201 practice questions
10 questions from our 200-201 practice tests, each with the correct answer and a written explanation. Read them with the answers shown, or switch to quiz mode and answer first.
Question 1 of 10, Security Concepts
In a government research lab, users cannot change who may read a document; access is granted only when the clearance level on the user account dominates the classification label assigned to the file by the system. Which access control model is in use?
- ADiscretionary access control
- BMandatory access control enforced by labels Correct answer
- CRole-based access control mapped to job functions
- DAttribute-based access control using environment conditions
Answer and explanation: Mandatory access control enforces system-assigned labels and clearances that users cannot override. Discretionary access control lets the resource owner grant access, role-based access control grants permissions through roles rather than labels, and attribute-based access control evaluates policies over many attributes rather than a strict clearance-versus-classification comparison.
Question 2 of 10, Security Concepts. Choose 2.
Which two statements correctly describe reverse engineering as used by malware analysts? (Choose two.)
- AIt refers to building a new detection signature by copying a vendor's existing rule set
- BIt replaces the need for sandbox detonation because static review always reveals runtime behavior
- CIt examines compiled code with tools such as disassemblers to understand what a sample does Correct answer
- DIt can reveal indicators such as hard-coded C2 domains or encryption routines inside a sample Correct answer
- EIt is performed only on network packets rather than on files or memory images
Answer and explanation: Reverse engineering uses disassemblers and debuggers on binaries to understand functionality and often exposes hard-coded C2 infrastructure or crypto routines. It complements rather than replaces dynamic sandbox analysis, because obfuscated code may hide runtime behavior; it is not copying vendor rules, and it applies to files and memory, not only to packets.
Question 3 of 10, Security Monitoring
A SOC analyst sees outbound connections from several workstations to IP addresses that public directories list as Tor entry guards. Why does this complicate monitoring?
- ATor rewrites the internal source IP address of every workstation, so the analyst cannot tell which internal host started each session
- BTor traffic uses UDP port 53 exclusively, so it is hidden inside normal DNS logs on the resolver
- CTor connections bypass the default gateway entirely, so they never appear in firewall or NetFlow records
- DTraffic is encrypted in layers and relayed, so the analyst cannot see the final destination or the content from the network Correct answer
Answer and explanation: Tor wraps traffic in multiple encryption layers and relays it through several nodes, hiding the ultimate destination and payload from local monitoring, although the connection to the entry node is still visible. Tor does not rewrite the internal source address seen locally, normally uses TCP rather than DNS, and still traverses the gateway and appears in flow and firewall logs.
Question 4 of 10, Security Monitoring
A crash dump from a network service shows that the instruction pointer was overwritten with a value made of repeated 0x41 bytes after a client sent an unusually long username field. What does this most likely indicate?
- AA buffer overflow attempt in which overlong input overwrote memory beyond the allocated buffer Correct answer
- BA SQL injection attempt in which the username was executed as a database query
- CA cross-site scripting attempt in which the username was rendered in another user's browser
- DA brute-force password attack in which many usernames were tried in rapid succession
Answer and explanation: Overlong input that overwrites adjacent memory, including the saved instruction pointer, is a buffer overflow, and repeated 0x41 bytes are the letter A commonly used as filler. SQL injection affects queries rather than memory, brute force produces many authentication failures rather than a crash, and XSS executes in browsers, not in the service process.
Question 5 of 10, Security Monitoring
An analyst sees that an internal host performed a full TLS handshake with a server whose certificate is self-signed, has a Subject of a random-looking string, and was valid for only two days. The JA3 hash matches a known malware family. What is the BEST interpretation?
- AThe certificate traits and JA3 match are strong C2 indicators that justify investigating the host Correct answer
- BThe finding is irrelevant because certificate details cannot be observed by sensors without decrypting the traffic
- CThe server must be an internal test system, because only internal servers ever use self-signed certificates
- DThe session is safe because TLS was negotiated successfully, which proves the server is legitimate
Answer and explanation: Certificate metadata and client fingerprints such as JA3 are visible in the handshake and are valuable C2 indicators even without decryption. A successful handshake proves nothing about legitimacy, TLS 1.2 handshakes expose the server certificate to passive sensors, and malicious external servers frequently use self-signed certificates.
Question 6 of 10, Host-Based Analysis
A memory forensic tool shows that a process named svchost.exe is running from C:\Users\Public\svchost.exe with explorer.exe as its parent. What makes this suspicious?
- ASvchost.exe should never run on modern Windows versions, so any instance indicates malware
- BGenuine svchost.exe runs from System32 under services.exe, so both path and parent are abnormal Correct answer
- CLegitimate svchost.exe runs only in user sessions, so a process running under the Public profile is expected
- DExplorer.exe is the normal parent for all service hosts, so only the file path deviates from normal behavior
Answer and explanation: Genuine svchost.exe lives in C:\Windows\System32 and is spawned by services.exe; an instance in a public user folder launched by explorer.exe is a classic masquerading indicator. It runs as service hosts in session 0 rather than as user processes, explorer.exe is not its normal parent, and svchost.exe is a standard part of current Windows.
Question 7 of 10, Host-Based Analysis
Process creation logs show winword.exe launching cmd.exe, which launches powershell.exe with the arguments -nop -w hidden -enc followed by a long Base64 string. What is the BEST interpretation and next step?
- AThe user opened a PowerShell console manually to run a script, so the event should be closed as expected activity
- BA routine Office update is running in the background, so the encoded command can be ignored once Word closes
- CA printer driver installation is in progress, because Word calls PowerShell to configure the default printer on first use
- DA malicious document likely spawned hidden, encoded PowerShell, so decode the string and scope the host and user Correct answer
Answer and explanation: Word spawning a shell that runs hidden, encoded PowerShell is a strong sign of a malicious macro or exploit; decoding the command and scoping the host are the right next steps. Office updates do not run under winword.exe this way, a manual console would not have Word as an ancestor, and printing does not invoke encoded PowerShell.
Question 8 of 10, Network Intrusion Analysis
A design team must choose between an inline IPS and a passive IDS connected to a network tap. Which statement BEST describes the trade-off?
- ABoth options can drop malicious packets equally, but only the inline IPS can generate alerts that are sent to a SIEM
- BThe inline IPS sees only copied traffic, so it cannot affect availability, while the tap-fed IDS must be sized to forward every packet
- CThe tap-fed IDS can block traffic in real time with no added latency, while the inline IPS only sees copies of packets after delivery
- DThe inline IPS can block in real time but adds latency and a failure point; the tap-fed IDS cannot block but never affects traffic Correct answer
Answer and explanation: Inline devices sit in the traffic path, so they can drop malicious packets but add latency and must be designed for failure handling, whereas a tap or SPAN feed gives a passive IDS a copy of traffic with no blocking ability. The other options reverse the roles of inline and passive monitoring or claim incorrect alerting limitations.
Question 9 of 10, Network Intrusion Analysis
A SOC is overwhelmed by alerts from a signature that fires on a legitimate backup application's traffic. What is the impact of these false positives, and what is the BEST corrective action?
- AThey cause alert fatigue that buries real alerts, so tune the signature with a narrow exception for the backup traffic Correct answer
- BThey cause missed detections, so the IPS should be switched from inline mode to promiscuous mode to reduce processing latency
- CThey prove that the backup application is compromised, so the backup servers should be reimaged immediately
- DThey have no operational impact, so analysts should continue closing each alert manually as it arrives
Answer and explanation: Excessive false positives lead to alert fatigue and real alerts being overlooked, so the rule should be tuned with a tightly scoped exception rather than disabled. Changing deployment mode does not fix rule accuracy, manual closing wastes analyst time, and a false positive by definition means the traffic is benign.
Question 10 of 10, Security Policies and Procedures
A SOC wants a metric showing how quickly incidents stop spreading after they are identified, because lateral movement has caused large losses. Which metric BEST reflects this goal, and what limits its scope?
- ANumber of alerts closed per shift, which measures how fast incidents stop spreading because closed alerts imply contained threats
- BMean time to recover, measured from detection until full restoration, which isolates containment speed from eradication work
- CMean time to contain, from detection until spread stops; it does not reflect how long the attacker went unseen Correct answer
- DMean time to detect, measured from first compromise until detection, which also captures the duration of lateral movement after alerts
Answer and explanation: Mean time to contain measures how long it takes to stop the spread after detection; it does not cover dwell time before detection. MTTD ends at detection, alert closure counts measure throughput rather than containment, and time to recover blends containment, eradication, and restoration rather than isolating containment.