CGRC
Free CGRC practice questions
10 questions from our CGRC practice tests, each with the correct answer and a written explanation. Read them with the answers shown, or switch to quiz mode and answer first.
Question 1 of 10, Security and Privacy Governance, Risk Management, and Compliance Program
A federal agency is establishing its risk management program and wants a single function that provides an organization-wide view of risk so that individual authorizing officials do not make decisions in isolation. Which role or function BEST fulfills this need?
- AThe system owner of the largest system, who chairs a committee that sets acceptable risk for all other system owners
- BThe common control provider, who aggregates residual risk from every inherited control into a single enterprise report
- CThe risk executive (function), which coordinates risk decisions across mission areas so tolerance is applied consistently Correct answer
- DThe senior agency information security officer, who approves each system security plan before the categorization step begins
Answer and explanation: In NIST SP 800-37 and SP 800-39 the risk executive (function) provides an organization-wide, holistic view of risk and helps authorizing officials make consistent decisions aligned to organizational risk tolerance. The SAISO manages the security program but does not approve plans before categorization or act as the cross-mission risk aggregator. A common control provider is responsible only for the controls it provides. No system owner has authority to set risk tolerance for other systems.
Question 2 of 10, Security and Privacy Governance, Risk Management, and Compliance Program
A risk assessment team is evaluating a threat to a payroll system. A disgruntled former administrator still has knowledge of the environment, and the organization's offboarding process sometimes misses service accounts. In SP 800-30 terms, how should the team describe these two elements?
- ABoth are structural threat sources, because they result from failures of organizational processes rather than intentional acts
- BThe former administrator is an adversarial threat source; the missed service accounts are a vulnerability raising likelihood Correct answer
- CThe former administrator is an environmental threat source, and the missed service accounts are the impact the event would cause
- DThe former administrator is a vulnerability, and the missed service accounts are the threat source that initiates a threat event against payroll
Answer and explanation: SP 800-30 classifies threat sources as adversarial, accidental, structural, or environmental; a former insider with intent and capability is adversarial. Weak offboarding is a vulnerability or predisposing condition that increases the likelihood a threat event succeeds. Swapping the roles misclassifies them, structural sources are failures of equipment or software, environmental sources are natural or infrastructure events, and impact is the resulting harm.
Question 3 of 10, Scope of the System
A system owner is defining the authorization boundary for a new case-management application. The application uses a shared enterprise identity service that is already authorized under its own boundary. How should the identity service be treated?
- APull the identity service inside the application boundary so all of its controls are reassessed during this authorization
- BIgnore the identity service entirely because it already has an authorization and needs no mention in the new plan
- CTreat the identity service as a subsystem and require its owner to sign the case-management security plan as co-owner
- DLeave it outside the boundary, document the interconnection, and inherit the identity controls it provides as common controls Correct answer
Answer and explanation: An already-authorized shared service stays in its own boundary; the new system documents the connection and inherits the controls the service provides, noting them as common or hybrid in its plan. Absorbing it into the new boundary duplicates assessment and confuses ownership. Ignoring it hides a dependency that must be documented. Making it a subsystem would wrongly place it under the new system owner's management authority.
Question 4 of 10, Selection and Approval of Framework, Security, and Privacy Controls
A merchant wants to meet a PCI DSS v4.0 requirement using a different control design that still achieves the requirement's stated objective. Which approach does PCI DSS v4.0 provide for this?
- AThe customized approach, with a controls matrix and a targeted risk analysis reviewed by the assessor Correct answer
- BThe defined approach, which lets merchants write their own requirements without any assessor validation
- CThe SAQ A self-assessment, which allows any merchant to skip requirements that do not fit its environment
- DThe compensating controls worksheet, which is used whenever the merchant simply prefers a different control
Answer and explanation: PCI DSS v4.0 introduced the customized approach for meeting a requirement's objective with a different design, documented in a controls matrix and targeted risk analysis and validated by the assessor. Compensating controls address legitimate constraints, not preference. The defined approach follows the stated requirements. SAQ A eligibility depends on the payment model and does not permit skipping applicable requirements.
Question 5 of 10, Implementation of Security and Privacy Controls
An organization needs to show that its implemented baseline configuration for servers aligns with an authoritative, security-focused configuration. Which source is MOST appropriate to build the baseline from?
- ARecognized benchmarks such as DISA STIGs or CIS Benchmarks, adapted and documented for the environment Correct answer
- BThe vendor's default installation settings, since they are tested by the vendor and are the most stable choice
- CThe control statements in SP 800-53, which define exact registry and file permission values for each platform
- DThe settings an administrator used on the last server built, captured as a template and reused everywhere
Answer and explanation: Security configuration benchmarks such as STIGs and CIS Benchmarks provide authoritative hardening settings that support CM-6, and deviations should be documented. Vendor defaults often favor usability over security. A copied ad hoc build has no authoritative basis. SP 800-53 controls are technology-neutral and do not specify platform settings.
Question 6 of 10, Implementation of Security and Privacy Controls
During the Implement step, a system administrator configured the hardening settings differently from what the security plan describes because the planned settings broke an application. What should happen next?
- ARecord the deviation only in the change ticket, because security plans are frozen after the Select step is complete
- BLeave the plan unchanged, since assessors should judge the system against the original design rather than the actual configuration
- CRevert the settings to match the plan, even though the application will stop working, so the documentation remains accurate
- DUpdate the security plan to reflect the as-implemented configuration and analyze whether the change alters risk before the assessment Correct answer
Answer and explanation: SP 800-37 requires the security plan to be updated with the as-implemented control details, including changes from the planned implementation, so assessors and the AO see reality. Assessing against an outdated design misrepresents risk. Breaking the application ignores mission needs; the right approach is to document and evaluate the alternative. Plans are living documents, not frozen after selection.
Question 7 of 10, Assessment/Audit of Security and Privacy Controls
A defense contractor seeks CMMC Level 2 certification for systems handling CUI. Which statement about the assessment is correct?
- AA certified third-party assessment organization assesses the SP 800-171 requirements when the contract calls for certification Correct answer
- BThe contractor's internal auditor assesses SP 800-53 high baseline controls and issues the certificate
- CA FedRAMP 3PAO assesses the contractor's cloud services, which automatically certifies Level 2
- DThe Department of Defense assesses ISO/IEC 27001 Annex A controls and awards Level 2 certification automatically
Answer and explanation: CMMC Level 2 is based on the SP 800-171 requirements, and when a contract calls for Level 2 certification (rather than self-assessment) a certified third-party assessment organization (C3PAO) performs the assessment. Internal auditors do not issue CMMC certificates, the basis is not the SP 800-53 high baseline or ISO 27001, and a FedRAMP assessment does not grant CMMC certification.
Question 8 of 10, Assessment/Audit of Security and Privacy Controls
An assessor discovers that a patch management control is not operating as intended and the system owner fixes it while the assessor is still on site. The assessor re-tests and confirms the fix. How should this be reflected in the assessment report?
- AReport the control as not applicable, because its status changed during the assessment period
- BRemove the finding from the report entirely, since the issue was corrected before the assessment ended
- CReport the control as satisfied, noting the original finding and the remediation verified on site Correct answer
- DReport the control as other than satisfied, because any weakness found during assessment must go to the POA&M
Answer and explanation: SP 800-37 allows initial remediation during the assessment; the assessor reassesses and records the updated status while preserving the original finding for transparency. Deleting the finding hides history the AO may need. A verified fix means the control is now satisfied, so it need not remain a POA&M item. Not applicable is for controls outside the system's scope.
Question 9 of 10, System Compliance
After reviewing the authorization package, an authorizing official determines that residual risk is acceptable but several moderate weaknesses must be corrected within six months. What is the MOST appropriate decision?
- AIssue an interim authorization to test, which allows full production use for up to six months
- BDefer the decision indefinitely and let the system run until the next assessment cycle
- CDeny authorization until all weaknesses are corrected, because any open finding makes the risk unacceptable
- DGrant an authorization to operate, with the weaknesses tracked in the POA&M and correction milestones set Correct answer
Answer and explanation: An AO can authorize when residual risk is acceptable and require that remaining weaknesses be corrected through the POA&M, possibly with explicit terms and conditions. Denial is for unacceptable risk, not every finding. An IATT covers testing in an operational environment, not production. Running without a decision is operating without authorization.
Question 10 of 10, Compliance Maintenance
Under ISO/IEC 27001, what should an organization do when a nonconformity is identified?
- AControl it, find the root cause, take corrective action, and review effectiveness Correct answer
- BClose it immediately to avoid it being counted during the next surveillance audit
- CDocument it and wait for the certification body to propose the corrective action
- DTreat it as an accepted risk without analysis, since nonconformities are routine
Answer and explanation: ISO/IEC 27001 clause 10 requires reacting to nonconformities, evaluating root cause, implementing corrective action, and reviewing effectiveness. Certification bodies do not design corrective actions, closing without action is improper, and nonconformities are not automatically accepted risks.