SOD
Free SOD practice questions
10 questions from our SOD practice tests, each with the correct answer and a written explanation. Read them with the answers shown, or switch to quiz mode and answer first.
Question 1 of 10, Alert Triage and Detection Tuning
The SOC's phishing-report mailbox receives 150 user submissions per day, and analysts spend most of the shift opening each one by hand. Most submissions are marketing mail or duplicates of the same campaign. What is the MOST effective way to reduce analyst workload while still catching real phishing?
- AAuto-close every submission whose sender domain has a valid SPF, DKIM and DMARC pass, since authenticated mail cannot be a phishing message
- BAutomate enrichment and cluster submissions by sender, URL or attachment hash so analysts review one case per campaign Correct answer
- CStop accepting user phishing reports and rely only on the secure email gateway verdicts, which already scan every inbound message for malicious content
- DAsk users to forward only messages they are certain are malicious, after a short training module
Answer and explanation: Clustering and enrichment collapse duplicate reports into a single case and push obvious marketing mail down the queue, so analyst time goes to distinct campaigns. Dropping user reports removes a valuable detection source for mail that bypassed the gateway, authentication passes are routinely obtained by attackers using their own or compromised domains, and discouraging reports increases the chance a real phish is never reported.
Question 2 of 10, Alert Triage and Detection Tuning
A SIEM rule fires 400 times a day for 'PowerShell launched with an encoded command'. Review shows 97% of hits come from a single software-deployment tool running signed scripts from one management server. The SOC must cut noise without losing visibility into attacker use of encoded PowerShell. What is the BEST tuning change?
- AExclude only the deployment tool's signed scripts from its management server, keeping the rule active for all other sources Correct answer
- BExclude every event where the PowerShell command line contains the -EncodedCommand flag from a host in the server subnet
- CRaise the rule's threshold so it only alerts when more than ten encoded PowerShell launches occur on one host within an hour
- DDisable the rule and rely on the EDR vendor's built-in PowerShell protections, which already block known malicious scripts
Answer and explanation: A narrow exclusion keyed on the known-good parent process, signer and source host removes the benign volume while attackers who use encoded PowerShell elsewhere still trigger the rule. A count threshold lets a single malicious launch slip through, disabling the rule removes visibility entirely, and a subnet-wide exclusion blinds the SOC on every server, which is exactly where attackers move laterally.
Question 3 of 10, Incident Response and Containment
A threat actor used a stolen service-account credential to create persistence on 30 Windows servers. The SOC has removed the scheduled tasks it found and wants to declare eradication complete. Which step is MOST important before closing eradication?
- ARebuild only the server where the initial access happened, since the other servers merely received pushed scheduled tasks
- BIncrease the logging level on the 30 servers for two weeks and close eradication if no new scheduled tasks appear
- CRun a full antivirus scan on the 30 servers and close eradication if no malware signatures are detected on any of them
- DRotate the stolen service-account credential and secrets it could read, then hunt for other persistence types Correct answer
Answer and explanation: As long as the attacker still holds a valid credential, they can recreate persistence at will, so rotating it and anything it exposed is essential, followed by hunting for persistence beyond scheduled tasks. An antivirus scan misses living-off-the-land techniques, rebuilding one server leaves the others untrusted, and waiting for new scheduled tasks ignores other persistence mechanisms and the live credential.
Question 4 of 10, Incident Response and Containment
An EDR alert shows a malicious script that disables shadow copies and stops backup services on a server. Encryption has not started. What is the BEST immediate action?
- ATake a full backup of the server immediately so that files are protected before any encryption
- BRestart the backup services and wait to see whether the script stops them again later tonight
- CDisable shadow copies on all other servers so the attacker gains nothing by deleting them later
- DIsolate the server, kill the script's process tree and check other hosts for the same activity Correct answer
Answer and explanation: Deleting shadow copies and stopping backups are classic pre-encryption steps, so isolating the host, stopping the process and hunting for the same behaviour elsewhere can prevent the ransomware stage. Restarting services and waiting gives the attacker time, a fresh backup from an attacker-controlled host may be compromised and slows containment, and disabling shadow copies elsewhere helps the attacker.
Question 5 of 10, Threat Hunting and Threat Intelligence
Hunters look for command-and-control beaconing in proxy logs. Many legitimate applications, such as update agents, also call home at regular intervals. Which method BEST separates likely beacons from benign periodic traffic?
- AExclude all connections over port 443, since encrypted traffic cannot be analysed for timing patterns without decryption
- BScore connection regularity per host and destination, then filter out destinations contacted by most of the fleet Correct answer
- CReview the top 100 destinations by total bytes transferred, because beacons usually move large amounts of data
- DAlert on every destination contacted at an exact interval of 60 seconds, because malware typically uses one-minute sleep timers
Answer and explanation: Beacons show low-variance timing to a destination that few hosts contact, so combining regularity scoring with fleet prevalence removes common update services. Fixed-interval rules miss jittered beacons, timing analysis works on encrypted traffic metadata, and beacons are typically small, so byte volume points to backups and downloads instead.
Question 6 of 10, Threat Hunting and Threat Intelligence
Hunters suspect DNS tunneling from a small number of hosts. The DNS resolver logs are available in the SIEM. Which analytic is MOST likely to surface tunneling with a manageable false-positive rate?
- AAlert on every DNS query whose response is a TXT record, since tunneling tools always use TXT records to move their data
- BPer-host query volume to one parent domain with long, high-entropy subdomains, excluding known CDN and vendor domains Correct answer
- CFlag any host that performs more than 1,000 DNS lookups per hour, because normal workstations rarely exceed that query rate
- DList all domains that were first seen in the environment today and send each one to an analyst for manual reputation review
Answer and explanation: Tunneling shows up as many long, random-looking subdomains under one parent domain from the same host, and excluding legitimate high-entropy services such as CDNs and security vendors keeps the noise down. TXT records are used by many legitimate services and tunnels can use other record types, first-seen domains are far too numerous to review manually, and raw query volume flags busy but benign hosts.
Question 7 of 10, Vulnerability and Exposure Prioritization
A scanner reports 4,000 critical-CVSS findings across the estate. The patch team can remediate about 200 per week. Which prioritisation approach BEST reduces real risk first?
- APatch the hosts with the largest number of findings first, since they contribute the most to the total open vulnerability count
- BRank by known exploitation (CISA KEV), exploit-likelihood scores, internet exposure and asset criticality Correct answer
- CRemediate the oldest findings first, because vulnerabilities that have been open the longest are the most likely to be exploited
- DRemediate strictly in descending CVSS base score order, starting with every 10.0
Answer and explanation: Combining evidence of active exploitation and exploit likelihood with exposure and business criticality focuses limited capacity on the vulnerabilities attackers will actually use against important assets. CVSS base scores describe severity but not likelihood, raw counts per host can be dominated by low-impact findings, and age alone says nothing about whether exploits exist.
Question 8 of 10, Cloud and Identity Security Operations. Choose 2.
A cloud threat-detection service alerts that an EC2 instance's role credentials are being used from an external IP. The instance runs a web application with a server-side request forgery bug reported last week. Which TWO actions BEST address the root cause and the immediate risk? (Choose two.)
- AEnforce IMDSv2 on the instance and fix the SSRF flaw so credentials cannot be fetched through the application Correct answer
- BMove the instance to a private subnet without changing anything else in the application or the metadata settings
- CAttach an additional deny policy to the users group in the account so human users cannot assume the role
- DRevoke the role's active sessions issued before now so the stolen credentials stop working Correct answer
- ERotate the SSH key pair of the instance so the attacker can no longer log in to the operating system
Answer and explanation: Revoking sessions issued before the current time invalidates temporary credentials already stolen, and requiring IMDSv2 plus fixing the SSRF closes the path by which the application leaked them. SSH keys are unrelated to credentials exfiltrated via the metadata service, moving subnets does not stop SSRF through the application, and restricting human users does not affect the instance role being abused.
Question 9 of 10, Cloud and Identity Security Operations
An alert shows that cloud audit logging was disabled in a production account at 02:14 by an admin role, and re-enabled at 02:51. No change ticket exists. What should the SOC do?
- ATreat it as a routine maintenance action: re-enabled logging shows the admin finished planned work and corrected the setting afterwards
- BTreat it as a likely attacker evasion: investigate the role's other actions and use alternative logs to reconstruct the 37-minute gap Correct answer
- CTreat it as a logging-service outage: open a support case with the provider and wait for their incident report before investigating
- DTreat it as an audit finding only: record it for the quarterly compliance review, since logging is already re-enabled now
Answer and explanation: Disabling audit logs without a change is a classic defence-evasion step, so the role's activity must be investigated and the gap reconstructed from other sources such as flow logs, service logs or provider-side events. Assuming maintenance ignores the missing ticket, a provider outage would not appear as a user API action, and deferring to a compliance review leaves a possible intrusion uninvestigated.
Question 10 of 10, Communication, Escalation and Post-Incident Review
During a major incident the CIO asks for status every 30 minutes, which keeps pulling the lead analyst away from the investigation. What is the BEST way to handle stakeholder communication?
- AAssign a communications lead who issues scheduled updates, so the technical lead stays on the investigation Correct answer
- BAsk the CIO to stop requesting updates until the investigation is finished, so that the analysts can concentrate on the incident
- CGive the CIO direct access to the analysts' working chat channel so they can follow every finding in real time
- DSend status only when there is a confirmed finding, which keeps updates accurate and avoids repeated messages with no news
Answer and explanation: Separating the communications role from the technical lead is a core incident-command practice: leaders get predictable updates and responders keep their focus. Refusing updates damages trust and decision-making, raw analyst chat contains unverified hypotheses that can mislead executives, and silence until a finding arrives leaves stakeholders guessing during long investigations.